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Abstract
Growth and imports are correlated across countries, but the mechanisms under-
lying this relationship are not well understood. I develop a multi-country model
in which imports and growth are connected by technological innovations and their
international diﬀusion through trade. Fitting the model to data on innovation, pro-
ductivity, and trade in varieties, I ﬁnd that most of the growthimports correlation
is explained by these two mechanisms. I also ﬁnd that the trade channel has been
particularly important in developing countries, accounting for about three-fourths
of their growth. Finally, I run counterfactuals analysis.
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1 Introduction
Although the positive correlation between imports and growth is well established, the
mechanisms underlying this relationhip are not well understood. Theories about the
eﬀects of imports on growth date back at least to Romer (1987) and Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991), but empirical work has been limited owing mostly to lack of data. The
disaggregated trade data that has more recently become available for many countries
yield new stylized facts. In particular, it appears that much of the increase in trade-
to-GDP ratio in the last decade stems from the extensive and not the intensive margin
of trade  that is, the number rather than the quantity of goods traded.1 During this
period, developing countries that expanded their range of imports grew much faster than
average. For instance, China and India grew at an average annual rate of 8% over 1994
2003 against a world average of 2%; at the same time, their growth in imported varieties
was 5 times that of developed economies.2 It therefore seems that understanding the
relation between growth in GDP and growth in imports requires an emphasis on the
extensive margin of trade.
I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which imports and growth are con-
nected by technological innovations and their international diﬀusion through trade. The
engine of economic growth is growth in productivity, which is driven by technology accu-
mulation.3 On top of an exogenous process of disembodied productivity growth, there
are two sources of embodied productivity growth. First, in the spirit of the new growth
theory, countries accumulate domestic technologies when their ﬁrms invest in R&D and
innovate. Second, because technology is assumed to be embodied in intermediate goods,
countries adopt foreign technologies embedded in the intermediate goods they import.
In the model, both innovation and adoption are endogenous processes. Firms in each
country invest in R&D to produce new technologies, and each new technology is then
used to produce an intermediate good. Domestic ﬁnal producers buy and use the new
intermediate good immediately whereas foreign ﬁnal producers must ﬁrst adopt it, which
requires investing resources over time (e.g., in learning). Hence, the speed of diﬀusion of
technologies through trade is endogenous.4
1Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Weinstein (2008) show that, for the average country, the extensive margin
explains more than 75% of the increase in this ratio. Hummels and Klenow (2002) also perform this
decomposition for exports and ﬁnd that the extensive margin explains two thirds of the increase in trade.
2Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Weinstein (2008) ﬁnd that, for developing countries, the extensive margin
explains almost all of productivity growth. Santacreu (2006) ﬁnds that more than 60% of Ireland's growth
during 19942003 was driven by an increase in the variety of imported goods from highly innovative
OECD countries.
3A large literature studies whether diﬀerences in growth rates are driven mainly by diﬀerences in
factor accumulation (capital, in particular) or in total factor productivity (TFP) (see Young (1991)).
Other authors who study the role of trade in explaining growth-rate diﬀerences have focused on capital
accumulation (Ventura (1997)). Easterly and Levine (2001) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005)
show that diﬀerences in TFP drive diﬀerences in growth rates across countries.
4Consistently with recent evidence (Comin and Hobijn (2004)), diﬀusion is modeled as a slow pro-
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I analyze both the model's steady state and its transition dynamics. In steady state,
international technology diﬀusion through trade ensures that all countries grow at the
same rate, but barriers to foreign technology adoption induce persistent income diﬀer-
ences.5 More interestingly, countries grow at diﬀerent rates during the transition phase
(from a low technology, developing economy to a high technology, developed one). I ﬁnd
that innovation and adoption through imports aﬀect a country's productivity growth dif-
ferently depending on its position on the transition path. Countries at early stages of
development, and so further away from the technological frontier, grow by adopting the
new foreign technologies embedded in the intermediate goods they import. In contrast,
countries at later stages of development and close to the technological frontier, grow by
developing new technologies through R&D.
The model is ﬁtted to 37 countries grouped into ﬁve regions: Asia, developing Europe,
developed Europe, Japan and Korea, and the United States. I use data on innovation,
productivity, and trade at the product level over 19942003 and employ Bayesian tech-
niques to estimate the structural parameters. I ﬁnd that embodied productivity explains
67% to 80% of the correlation between growth in imports and growth in GDP per capita
over the sample period. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that adoption of foreign technologies through
trade is an important source of embodied growth for developing countries, whereas do-
mestic innovation is the main source of embodied growth for developed countries. Indeed,
about 75% of embodied growth in Asia can be explained by foreign innovations, espe-
cially from the United States and Japan. These two countries are also the main sources
of foreign technology for other regions.6
Finally, I conduct counterfactual experiments to study the link between trade and
growth by changing various exogenous parameters. I ﬁnd that, following a decrease in
barriers to adoption, countries at earlier stages of development initiate the transition
and convergence toward the income levels of developed countries. Countries closer to
the technological frontier, however, need policies that spur innovation in order to keep
growing.
This paper builds on several streams of literature. The ﬁrst one concerns endogenous
growth fueled by technology embodied in new goods, as in Romer (1987). Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) provide empirical evidence that conventionally
measured TFP increases with imported varieties. My model also considers an exogenous
component of TFP that represents disembodied technology as in Greenwood, Hercowitz,
cess whose speed depends on the resources invested by the adopters. Eaton and Kortum (1999) ﬁnd
that international diﬀusion is much slower than domestic diﬀusion; I make the extreme and simplifying
assumption that domestic diﬀusion is free and instantaneous.
5Rodriguez-Clare and Klenow (1997) review models of international diﬀusion of technology that pre-
dict a common constant growth rate.
6Cameron, Proudman, and Redding (2005) analyze a panel of UK manufacturing industries, and
ﬁnd that innovation and technology transfers are the main sources of productivity growth for countries
lagging behind the technology frontier.
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and Krusell (1997).
Second, I follow Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1999) in positing technological innova-
tions and their international diﬀusion through trade as potential channels of embodied
technological progress.7 In my model, however, the pace of innovation and the speed
of diﬀusion are both endogenous. Comin and Gertler (2006) and Comin, Gertler, and
Santacreu (2009) also model endogenous diﬀusion in a business cycle model for a closed
economy. I adapt their framework to an open-economy model.
The lack of direct measures of adoption has led to the use of indirect ones, such as
trade in intermediate goods (Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991); Eaton and Kortum (2001)
and Eaton and Kortum (2002)) or international patenting (Eaton and Kortum (1996,
1999)).8 Because this paper aims to understand the tradegrowth connection, I use
trade as an indirect measure of diﬀusion. Trade allows countries to adopt innovations
developed abroad. Along these lines, Coe, Helpman, and Hoﬀmaister (1997) ﬁnd that,
for developing countries, TFP is related to the stock of R&D carried out by their trading
partners. My paper extends this literature by taking explicit account of the mechanisms
connecting trade and growth.
This paper also relates to the literature on trade in varieties (Feenstra (1994); Broda
and Weinstein (2006); Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Weinstein (2008)). I follow their method-
ology to construct a measure of the extensive margin of trade, but I model explicitly the
ﬁrms' incentives for R&D and adoption. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova
(2009) ﬁnd that, once allowed by trade liberalization in India during the 1990s, access to
foreign inputs raised productivity levels, and thereby generated static gains from trade.9
Furthermore, they show that new foreign inputs also lowered the cost of innovation, which
enabled the creation of new varieties and hence dynamic gains from trade. My model
allows for this mechanism by introducing learning from imports in the innovation process.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the data, and Section 3 presents
the model. Sections 4 and 5 study the steady state and transition dynamics, respectively.
Sections 6 to 8 explain the estimation procedure and report the results. Section 9 reports
on the counterfactual experiments, and Section 10 concludes.
2 A First Look at the Data
This section presents some stylized facts based on correlations among trade, innovation,
and productivity. I use data for a sample of 37 countries divided into three groups ac-
cording to their level of income and economic growth: (i) high-income, slow-growing
7 Keller (2004) surveys empirical studies of innovation and diﬀusion.
8 Comin and Hobijn (2004) provide direct measures of adoption for many countries over a long sample
period; however, they do not distinguish between domestic and imported technologies.
9Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) estimate a model of importers in Hungarian micro data and ﬁnd
that importing all foreign varieties would increase ﬁrm productivity by 12%.
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countries (developed Europe, Japan and Korea, and the United States); (ii) low-income,
fast-growing countries (developing Europe and Asia); and (iii) low-income, slow-growing
countries (Africa and Latin America). These groups also diﬀer markedly in terms of in-
novation and imports. For instance, developed countries are more innovative and expand
the variety of their imports less than average. No developing country does much inno-
vation; however, those that grow faster than average expand the variety of their imports
whereas the others do not.
First, we observe that the average growth rate of income per capita is positively cor-
related with the expansion in import variety (Figure 1).10 The average is taken over
19942003. The red circles in the ﬁgure represent less developed countries in Asia, Eu-
rope, Africa, and Latin America; the blue circles represent developed countries in Europe,
Japan, and the United States. I use bilateral trade data (at the 6-digit level of disaggre-
gation), from UN COMTRADE, and deﬁne a variety as a 6-digit product from a speciﬁc
source of exports. Growth in imported varieties is computed as in Broda, Greenﬁeld, and
Weinstein (2008), adjusting for quality and symmetry bias. Output growth is growth in
real GDP per capita, taken from the Penn World Table and adjusted by the extensive
margin of intermediate imports as in Feenstra (1994) and Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Wein-
stein (2008). The United States, Japan, and Germany are at one end of the spectrum,
with less import variety and lower economic growth; China, Vietnam, and India are at
the other end. Although the link between the two variables is clear, we cannot infer
causality.
Second, we observe that developed countries which are closer to the technological
frontierinnovate more. A proxy for innovation is research intensity, the fraction of GDP
invested in R&D. Indeed, ﬁgure 2 shows a positive correlation between GDP and research
intensity. A more direct way to measure innovation is to look at the number of products
developed in a country. Owing to lack of data, I use the number of goods exported by a
country as a proxy for the number of innovations in that country. We observe a positive
correlation between the number of goods a country exports and its research intensity
measured as the fraction of workers employed in R&D (Figure 3).
Third, we observe that developing countries that grow faster than average expand
more the variety of their imports (Figure 1). This is the case for Asia and some countries
in Europe. At the same time, there are countries in Africa and Latin America with initial
levels of income similar to those in Asia and developing Europe but that either failed to
expand the variety of their imports or saw their innovation stagnate (Figure 1).
The empirical evidence suggests that countries farther from the technology frontier
may grow faster than average by adopting foreign technologies embedded in the goods
10One could argue that exports are no less important than imports in explaining the development
experienced by Asia and Eastern Europe. However, the correlation computed between productivity
growth and growth in exported varieties is only 0.4, whereas it is almost 0.8 between productivity
growth and growth in imports.
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they import. Countries closer to the technology frontier grow mainly by innovating and
pushing this frontier.
3 The Model
I develop a multi-country growth model in which technological progress is driven by
endogenous innovation and the adoption of new technologies. In each country there is a set
of available technologies produced by both domestic and foreign intermediate producers.
Labor is the only factor of production, and it is used to produce traded intermediate
goods. Intermediate goods are combined to produce a non-traded ﬁnal good, which is
used for consumption, domestic innovation and adoption of foreign innovations. Time is
discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, . . ., and there are I countries in the world, indexed by n =
1, 2, . . . I. Each period of time is divided into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, production and
consumption takes place, while taking each country's technologies as given. In the second
stage, innovation and adoption of technologies takes place, determining the technologies
available in the next time period.
3.1 Production and Consumption
3.1.1 Intermediate Production
In each country n, the total labor supply Ln is employed by a continuum of monopolisti-
cally competitive ﬁrms to produce intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, Znt], where Znt
represents the mass (or, alternatively, the number) of available products. I assume in-
termediate goods to be diﬀerentiated by source of exports; that is, countries exogenously
specialize in diﬀerent sets of goods (Armington assumption). As is standard practice
in the literature, I deﬁne variety nj as the intermediate good j produced in country
n.11 Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerent good according to a CRS (constant returns to scale)
production function
ynjt = lnjt, (1)
where ynjt is the quantity of variety nj produced and lnjt is the amount of labor employed
in its production. Note that all intermediate producers in a country have the same
productivity regardless of which good they produce.
The producer of variety nj takes as given the demand by the ﬁnal producer in each
country i = 1, 2, ..., I and sets a price that is a constant markup over the marginal
cost. Prices can diﬀer across countries because markets are segmented owing to iceberg
11The Armington assumption allows us to deﬁne a variety nj as a good j from a particular country
n. In this sense, good j produced in country n is a diﬀerent variety from good j produced in country k.
6
transport costs: for products shipped from country n to country i, the transport cost is
din > d
n
n = 1 for i 6= n. The marginal cost is given by domestic wages because labor is
the only factor of production. Hence the price in country i of variety nj is
pinjt =
σ
σ − 1ωntd
i
n, (2)
where σ
σ−1 is the markup (σ will be determined in Section 3.1.2) and wnt is the wage in
country n.
The proﬁt of the producer of variety nj is
pinjt =
I∑
i=1
(pinjt − ωnt)xinjt =
1
σ − 1
I∑
i=1
pinjtx
i
njt, (3)
where xinjt is the demand for variety nj by the ﬁnal-good producer in country i, to be
determined in the next section.
3.1.2 Final Production
In each country i, a perfectly competitive ﬁrm (henceforth ﬁnal producer) uses traded
intermediate goodsboth domestic and foreign to produce a non-traded ﬁnal good,
Yit. Varieties are combined according to the CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
production function
Yit = e
ait
(
I∑
n=1
ˆ Aint
j=0
binjt(x
i
njt)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
, (4)
where Aint is the mass of intermediate goods that country i imports from country n,
binjt are the so-called Armington weights and represent the share of country i's spending
on variety nj, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties (which are perfect
substitutes when σ →∞), and ait is an exogenous TFP shock following the AR(1) process
ait = g¯t+ ρai,t−1 + uit, (5)
where the steady-state growth rate, g¯ ∈ (0, 1), ρ ∈ (0, 1), and uit ∼ N(0, σ2u).
The engine of economic growth is growth in productivity, which itself is driven by
technological progress. Technology is embodied in intermediate goods traded across coun-
tries and potentially used by ﬁnal producers in all countries. This is captured by the CES
production function, which introduces a so-called love-for-variety eﬀect: holding expen-
ditures constant, using a wider range of varieties corresponds to increased productivity
(Ethier 1982). The shock process ait introduces an additional channel of technologi-
cal progress, which I refer to as disembodied technology (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell 1997); it captures the unexplained component of productivity growth given g¯ the
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steady state growth rate.
The ﬁnal producer chooses xinjt to maximize his proﬁt Πit,
Πit = PitYit −
I∑
n=1
ˆ Aint
j=0
pinjtx
i
njt dj, (6)
where Pit is the price index for the ﬁnal good, which takes the CES form
Pit =
(
I∑
n=i
ˆ Aint
j=0
(binjt)
σ
(
pinjt
)1−σ
dj
)
.
1
1−σ (7)
This equality implies the following demand for variety nj:
xinjt = (b
i
njt)
σ
(
pinjt
Pit
)−σ
Yit. (8)
Total spending by country i on variety nj is then
pinjtx
i
njt = (b
i
njt)
σ
(
pinjt
Pit
)1−σ
PitYit. (9)
3.1.3 Households
In each country n = 1, . . . , I, a representative household consumes the ﬁnal good, supplies
labor inelastically, and saves. The household maximizes life-time expected utility
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs log(Cns) (10)
subject to the budget constraint
PntCnt = ωntLnt + Π
T
nt +RntBnt −Bn,t+1. (11)
Here Cnt is consumption, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ωnt is the wage, ΠTnt are the
total proﬁts of all ﬁrms in country n, Bnt is total loans the household extended at time
t− 1 and that are payable at time t, and Rnt is the risk-free rate. The household chooses
consumption, labor supply, and loans to maximize (10) subject to (11).
3.2 Innovation and Adoption
In each time period's second stage, innovation and adoption of technologies determine
the technology available in each country at time t + 1. New technologies are introduced
endogenously through an innovation process, and each new technology is then used to
produce an intermediate good under monopolistic competition. Intermediate goods can
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immediately be sold to the domestic ﬁnal producer. However, to sell the good in a foreign
market, it has to be adapted ﬁrst.
3.2.1 Innovation
In each country n = 1, . . . , I, a continuum of start-ups invest the ﬁnal good to undertake
R&D. Start-ups are ranked according to their eﬃciency: a start-up with productivity k
introduces a new technology at the stochastic rate
αrnγrTntY
−γr
nt k
γr−1,
where αrnTnt is R&D productivity and γr ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter of diminishing returns
to R&D.12 The fraction of total output invested in R&D,
yrnt
Ynt
, measures research intensity
in country n. If yrnt units of ﬁnal output are invested in R&D, then the mass of newly
introduced technologies is
EtZn,t+1 − Znt =
ˆ yrnt
k=0
αrnγrTntY
γr
nt k
γr−1 dk = αrnTnt
(
yrnt
Ynt
)γr
, (12)
There are two components of R&D productivity. First, a country-speciﬁc parame-
ter αrn captures policies and institutions aﬀecting the country's innovative environment
(patent protection, education, etc.). Second, a spillover eﬀect is determined by the total
number of technologies available, Tnt = Znt +
∑
i 6=nA
n
it, where Znt is the stock of tech-
nologies introduced domestically through innovation in country i up to period t. That is,
innovators learn from the available range of technologies, both domestic Znt (learning
by doing) and foreign {Anit} (learning by using imports). This assumption is consistent
with the variety in, variety out model of Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova
(2009) and has two implications: ﬁrst, countries in which more varieties are available
have a lower R&D cost; second, countries expanding the variety of their imports (grow-
ing {Aint}) lower their R&D cost.13
Each start-up chooses how much ﬁnal output to invest in R&D in order to maximize
expected proﬁts. Free entry determines the level of investment in R&D, which is given
by the break-even condition
αrnγr(γr − 1)TntY γrnt kγr−2Vnt = Pnt, (13)
12This functional form is similar to the innovation process in Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1999). The
main diﬀerence is that innovators employ labor in their model whereas in my model they invest ﬁnal
output.
13As a consequence, countries may shift from being adopters to innovators, thereby increasing the
number of goods that they produce and export. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002) considers
this process a shift from an investment-growth strategy (adoption) to an innovation-shift strategy
(innovation). That reasoning is also in line with the results of Hallward-Driemeier (2000), who in data
from ﬁve Asian countries observes thatprior to entry into export marketsproductivity gains are
associated with higher imports.
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where Vnt is the market price for an innovation (to be determined). The start-ups invest
ﬁnal output up to the point where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Successful
start-ups use the new technology to produce an intermediate good; that is, they join the
pool of intermediate-good producers in period t+ 1.
3.2.2 Adoption
Each intermediate good that is produced with the new technology must be adopted before
it can be used by the ﬁnal producer. I assume that adoption is instantaneous and free
within countries but slow and costly across countries. Thus, whereas a country's ﬁnal
producer can use all the domestic intermediate goods produced, using foreign intermediate
goods involves an adoption process: an adopter in country i invests ﬁnal output to adapt
the product to that country's speciﬁcations. Out of Znt goods available in country n,
Znt+1 − Aint remain to be adopted by the ﬁnal producer in country i. An adopter in
country i invests a quantity hint of ﬁnal output to adapt the Znt+1 − Aint technologies,
which are then adopted at the stochastic rate
εint = α
A
i
Aint
Zn,t+1
(
hint
Yit
)γa
. (14)
Here αAi is a country-speciﬁc parameter reﬂecting barriers to adoption of new technologies,
as in Parente and Prescott (2002) (a higher value of this parameter implies lower barriers
to adoption); and γa ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of adoption with respect to investment in
adoption.14 The number of newly adopted technologies is then given by
EtA
i
n,t+1 − Aint = εint(Zn,t+1 − Aint). (15)
This speciﬁcation is similar to that in Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994).
Equation (15) exhibits four main features. First, it has the same microfoundations as
the innovation process, with diminishing returns to investment in adoption. Second, the
cost of adoption is measured in terms of the importer's ﬁnal output. So when the cost
of adoption decreases, the demand for ﬁnal output in the destination country increases,
thereby increasing income; thus countries with decreasing adoption costs (increasing rate
of adoption) see their income increase. Third, the cost of adoption resembles a ﬁxed
cost of penetrating a foreign market. Fourth, as the destination country starts to import
goods, it becomes familiar with the exporter's products (increase in
Aint
Zn,t+1
), and so less
14Policies that aﬀect this parameter include increasing investment in education, an improvement in
telecommunications infrastructure that facilitates communication across countries, and trade policies.
Eaton and Kortum (1996) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) analyze the dependence of the probability
of adoption on diﬀerent factors, including human capital; they ﬁnd that human capital has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of adoption.
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ﬁnal output is needed to start exporting the good. Interactions among the countries allow
the importer to learn about the source and this leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in
the probability of adoption.15
Observe that the existence of a continuum of intermediate goods means that the
probability of adoption εint is also the fraction of technologies adopted.
16
To gain a better understanding of the adoption process, I substitute equation (14)
into equation (15) to ﬁnd the growth rate of adopted technologies:
gAint =
Et(A
i
nt+1 − Aint)
Aint
= αAi
(
hint
Yit
)γa
Lit
(
1− A
i
nt
Znt+1
)
.
The growth rate in the number of goods that country i imports from country n at
time t depends on four factors: (i) barriers to adoption, αAi ; (ii) investment in adoption,
hint; (iii) elasticity of adoption, γa; and (iv) relative backwardness, 1− A
i
nt
Znt+1
. In countries
that are farther from the exporter's technological frontier (lower
Aint
Zn,t+1
), an increase in
the variety of imports has a greater impact on the growth in the variety of imports.17
Two key assumptions in the adoption mechanism are nonstandard. First, investment in
adoption is measured in terms of the importing country. Second, adoption measures the
ability to import a new technology, which implies that adoption is irreversible. Adopters
choose the amount of output to invest in adoption to maximize the expected proﬁts from
selling the good to the ﬁnal producer in diﬀerent countries (to be determined).
3.2.3 Value Functions
Domestic innovation and adoption of foreign innovations are both endogenous processes.
Adopters and innovators decide how much ﬁnal output to allocate to each activity based
on the relative values of innovating and adopting a new technology.
The value W int of adopted technologies from country n by country i at time t is given
by the present discounted value from selling that good:
W int = pi
i
nt + βEtW
i
n,t+1, (16)
15A diﬀerent way to model the process of adoption is to assume that investment in adoption pays oﬀ
after a random time period. Higher investment in adoption results in a shorter expected waiting time
for the next variety (Klette and Kortum (2004); Koren and Tenreyro (2007)).
16Cummins and Violante (2002) focus on the adjustment of productivity growth to technological in-
novations. They estimate that the gap between average productivity and the productivity of the best
technology rose from 15% in 1975 to 40% in 2000. This ﬁnding is consistent with technology diﬀusion
models that claim learning about new technologies can generate long implementation lags because re-
sources are channeled into the process of adapting current production structures to accommodate the
new technology.
17Empirically, countries that are expanding their range of imports rapidly are relatively backward
countries that are also experiencing higher-than-average growth rates.
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where piint denotes proﬁts and W
i
n,t+1 the continuation value.
The value of technologies invented in country n at time t that have yet to be adopted
by country i is
J int = max
Y int
{−Pithint + βEt(εintW in,t+1 + β(1− εint)J in,t+1)}. (17)
At time t, the adopter invests the quantity hint to adapt the technologies to the speciﬁ-
cations of country i. At t + 1, adoption is successful with probability εint and the ﬁrm
obtains the value of an adopted technology, W in,t+1; with probability 1− εint, adoption is
not successful and the ﬁrm obtains the continuation value J in,t+1.
The value Vnt for an innovation in country n is the expected value of selling the good
in each potential market:
Vnt =
I∑
i=1
J int (18)
with Jnnt = W
n
nt.
3.3 Trade Balance
The model is closed with the trade balance equation. I assume ﬁnancial autarky, thereby
trade is balanced every period. In other words, the total value of exports in one country
must equal the total value of its imports:
I∑
i=1
ˆ Aint
j=0
pinjtx
i
njt dj =
I∑
n=1
ˆ Anit
j=0
pnijtx
n
ijt dj. (19)
3.4 Equilibrium
This section deﬁnes a symmetric equilibriumnamely, the equations in which all the
ﬁrms within a country behave symmetrically. The countries themselves are asymmetric,
however, and are deﬁned by the parameters {αRi , αAi , Li, din}.
For all i and n, a general symmetric equilibrium is deﬁned as an exogenous stochastic
sequence {ait}∞t=0, an initial vector {Ain0, Zi0}, a set of parameters {σ, γa, γr, ρ} that are
common across countries, a set of parameters {αRi , αAi , Li, din} that diﬀer across countries,
a sequence of aggregate prices and wages {Pit, Vit, Rit, ωit}∞t=0, a sequence of intermediate
good prices {pint}∞t=0, a sequence of aggregate quantities {Yit, yrit, hint}∞t=0, quantities of in-
termediate goods {xint, ynt}∞t=0, a sequence of value functions and proﬁt {piint,W int, J int}∞t=0,
and laws of motion {Ain,t+1, Zi,t+1}∞t=0 such that:
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• the state variables {Ain,t+1, Zi,t+1}∞t=0 satisfy the laws of motion in equations (15)
and (22);
• the endogenous variables solve the producers' and households' problems in equations
(24)  (30);
• feasibility is satisﬁed in equations (20) and (21); and
• prices are such that all markets clear.
Next, I present the set of equations needed to solve the model.
Resource Constraint
Final output is used for consumption, innovation, and adoption of foreign innovations:
Yit = Cit +
I∑
n6=i
(Zit − Anit)hnit + (Zit − Zit−1)yrit. (20)
Final Production
Yit = e
ait
(
I∑
n=1
Aintb
i
nt(x
i
nt)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
. (21)
Law of Motion for Innovation
EtZi,t+1 − Zit = αriTit
(
yrit
Yit
)γr
. (22)
Law of Motion for Adoption
EtA
i
n,t+1 − Aint = εint(Zn,t+1 − Aint). (23)
Households
1
β
Ci,t+1
Cit
=
Pit
Pi,t+1
Ri,t+1. (24)
Final Producers
xinjt = (b
i
njt)
σ
(
pinjt
Pit
)−σ
Yit. (25)
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Intermediate Producers
In equilibrium, all the intermediate producers in a country behave symmetrically. They
use the same amount of labor and supply the same amount of intermediate good to a
given country i: xinjt = x
i
nt for all j. Summing over all A
i
nt intermediate goods that
country n exports to country i yields
I∑
i=1
Aintl
i
nt = Ln.
.
By symmetry, and as we can see from the expression
pint =
σ
σ − 1(ωntd
i
n), (26)
the price index and the proﬁts are equal across intermediate producers; that is, pinjt = p
i
nt
for all j and piinjt = pi
i
nt for all j.
Investment in Innovation
Investments in innovation and adoption are chosen to maximize Vit and J
i
nt. Start-ups in
country i invest in R&D up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal
cost. By equation (13), if Y Rit units of ﬁnal output are invested in R&D then
Yritˆ
k=0
αriγrTitY
γr
it k
γr−1Vit dk = γrαri
(
yrit
Yit
)γr−1 TitVit
Yit
= 1, (27)
where
Vit = W
i
it +
∑
n 6=i
Jnit, (28)
W int = pi
i
nt + βEt
1
1 + gAint
W in,t+1,
J int =
{
−PitY int + βEt
(
εint
1
1 + gAint
W in,t+1 + β(1− εint)
1
1 + gAint
J in,t+1
)}
. (29)
Investment in Adoption
The adopter in country i uses ﬁnal output to adapt technologies from country n until
marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost:
γaα
A
i
(
hint
Yit
)γa−1 Aint
Zn,t+1
W in,t+1 − J in,t+1
Yit
= 1. (30)
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Observe that the marginal beneﬁt of adoption increases with the productivity of adop-
tion and also with the diﬀerence between the value of adopted and yet-to-be-adopted
technologies (i.e., between W int and J
i
nt).
Trade Balance
I∑
i=1
Aintp
i
ntx
i
nt =
I∑
n=1
Anitp
n
itx
n
it. (31)
Market-Clearing Conditions
ˆ Znt
j=0
lnjt dj = Ln, (32)
ynjt =
I∑
i=1
xinjt. (33)
4 The Steady State
The economy has a balanced growth path in which all countries grow at the same rate but
diﬀer in their income per capita. The common growth rate is guaranteed by international
diﬀusion; in contrast, diﬀerences in income per capita are driven by the country-speciﬁc
parameters {αri , αAi , Li, {din}n6=i}, which can be identiﬁed from the system's initial condi-
tions. If instead the parameters are common across countries, then all countries reach the
same steady stateboth in levels and in growth ratesand diﬀer only in their speeds of
convergence.
In steady state, the endogenous variables grow at a constant rate. Therefore, by
equation (20) and equations (22) and (23), the number of adopted technologies and
of invented technologies (Aint and Znt, respectively) grow at the same rate along the
balanced growth path. By equation (14), the rate of adoption εint is constant (this rate
is obtained using the survival analysis techniques explained in Appendix D). From the
resource constraint (20), it is evident that the quantity of output allocated to adoption
and innovation grows at the rate of ﬁnal output.
Solving for the steady state requires an algorithm to compute relative wages. Taking
advantage of the recursive structure of the model, I proceed as follows. First, from the law
of motion for newly adopted technologies and the prediction that the rate of adoption εint
is constant, the steady-state value of the fraction of technologies from country n that have
been adopted by country i between t and t+ 1 can be obtained as A
i
n
Zn(1+gz)
= ε
i
n
ga+εin
. We
can use this equality to derive the ratio A
i
n
Aik
and an expression for Zn
Zk
. We can approximate
the ratio Zn
Zk
by the ratio of the number of varieties exported. Finally, the trade-balanced
equation (31) is used to obtain relative wages.
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5 Transition Dynamics
Diﬀerences in growth rates across countries arise in the transition and depend on diﬀer-
ences in investment in innovation and adoption, which ultimately depend on diﬀerences in
income per capita. For countries in early stages of development, adoption is cheaper than
innovation and so more resources are invested in adopting foreign technologies; catching-
up allows these countries to grow faster than average. As they start importing more
goods, the productivity of R&D increases in response to the spillover eﬀect, increasing
the attractiveness of innovation; hence, they start allocating more resources to innova-
tion. In short, countries located at diﬀerent points on the transition path invest and
adopt at diﬀerent rates and therefore grow at diﬀerent rates. Developed countries are
mainly innovators, while developing countries are mainly adopters of foreign innovations.
The model is solved by log-linearizing around the steady state. The variables are
stationarized so that they are constant in steady state. There are two trends in the model:
the ﬁrst is given by the growth rate of disembodied technology, which is exogenous; the
second is endogenous and depends on the growth rate of newly developed technologies
gz. I use Dynare to solve and estimate the structural parameters.
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6 Empirical Strategy
Section 5 has described a fully speciﬁed structural stochastic model with interdepen-
dencies across countries. In this section, I ﬁt the model to annual data on innovation,
productivity, and imports, for the period 19952003. I then use the structural nature of
the model to conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to understand the main mech-
anisms in the connections between growth and imports. The small sample size (only
nine years of data) and the rich structure of the model require the use of non-classical
estimation methods in order to obtain consistent estimates. I use Bayesian techniques to
estimate the relevant parameters of the model, as described in Schorfheide (1999).19
6.1 Bayesian Estimation
Bayesian estimation is a mix between classical estimation and calibration. Relative to
just using calibration, Bayesian estimation allows us to confront the model with the
data in a statistical sense. Relative to classical estimation there are three advantages.
First, Bayesian estimation has better properties when the sample size is relatively small
(which is the case in this paper). Second, it allows us to estimate a fully speciﬁed model
with fairly ﬂexible stochastic processes. Correct estimates of these models and processes
18 The set of log-linearized equations is available upon request.
19The Dynare program (see (Juillard 1996)) is used to solve and estimate the model. The code is
available upon request.
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enable a study of the system's transition dynamics that captures cross-country growth
rates diﬀerences, as observed in the data. And third, classical inference might not provide
consistent results in multi-country models with interdependencies, as argued by Canova
and Ciccarelli (2009). They show that Bayesian methods are necessary to estimate multi-
country VARmodels with spillover eﬀects across regions, especially when examining issues
related to income convergence or evaluating the eﬀects of regional policies. In those
models GMM (generalized method of moments) estimators of QML (quasi-maximum
likelihood) and minimum distance estimators, do not provide consistent results.20
Next, I describe brieﬂy the main steps to follow when estimating a model with
Bayesian techniques. First, we need to specify prior probability distributions for the
parameters of interest. The priors are then combined with the likelihood density, which
is confronted to the data in order to obtain the posterior distribution of these parame-
ters. Second, the likelihood density is approximated by a kernel density function, using
MCMC simulation methods. This method works if all the variables are observable in the
data, but usually this is not the case in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models generally (and in my model in particular) which involve unobservable variables
including, for example, the number of newly innovated technologies, the total amount of
output invested in adoption and the shock processes. To establish the likelihood density
in these cases, we must obtain a state-space representation of the model and apply the
Kalman ﬁlter. In a ﬁnal step, the Metropolis Hasting algorithm is used to derive the
posterior distribution of the parameters.
6.2 Data and Priors
For tractability, I allocate the 37 countries to ﬁve regional groups with common char-
acteristics (similar innovation intensity, extensive margins of trade, and productivity):
the United States, Japan, European countries with R&D investment above the median,
European countries with R&D investment below the median, and Asia.21
6.2.1 Data
The model is ﬁtted to annual data for the period 19962005, because 1995 is the ﬁrst
year for which data at a high level of disaggregation are available for a large sample
of countries.22 The observable variables are the annual growth in imported varieties,
output growth, and the fraction of workers employed in R&D. There are 135 observations
corresponding to nine years, ﬁve regions, and three observable variables.
20Another good reference on the evolution of DSGE modelling and the need to use Bayesian estimation
in these models can be found in Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
21See Appendix A for the countries grouped within each region.
22For the sample of countries studied in the analysis, there are only 8 years of very disaggregated trade
data available.
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Bilateral trade data are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. I follow the
HS-1996 classiﬁcation, which lists goods at the 6-digit level of disaggregation, and restrict
the analysis to intermediate products (see Appendix B). Output is measured as GDP per
capita adjusted via purchasing power parity (PPP) to constant 2005 prices; the data are
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and this measure is adjusted to
account for the extensive margin of trade (see Appendix C). Finally, the research intensity
of a country is measured by the fraction of workers employed in R&D (again based on
data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators).
6.2.2 Shocks
To obtain invertibility in the likelihood function, the maximum likelihood approach re-
quires as many shocks as there are observable variables. Given three series of observable
variables, I introduce three series of shocks (one for each region): a neutral technol-
ogy shock ai in ﬁnal production, an i.i.d. shock a
α
it to innovation productivity, and a
measurement error in the growth rates of imported varieties.
The structural shocks and measurement errors incorporated in the estimation are:
ait = ρiai,t−1 + uit
with uit ∼ N(0, σ2u,i);
ξit ∼ N(0, σ2i );
and
gobsit = gite
meit
with meit ∼ N(0, σ2me,i), where me denotes the measurement error and i = 1, . . . , 5.
6.2.3 Parameters
A set of parameters is treated as ﬁxed in the estimation (these are also known as strict
priors or calibrated parameters). These parameters cannot be identiﬁed from the data.
They are obtained from other studies or from steady-state relations, and they are reported
in Table 1 and Table 2.
The iceberg transport cost, din, varies across pairs of countries and is proportional
to distance. This parameter's value is chosen to match the intensive margin of trade.
The steady-sate growth rate of domestic and foreign technologies is the same and com-
mon across countries. Following Eaton and Kortum (1996), I use the Frobenious theorem
and the steady-state relation for the growth of new technologies derived in Appendix E
to obtain a value of 0.012 for this parameter. If we assume a steady-state growth rate of
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0.02 for the regions in the analysis, as it is standard in the empirical literature, the results
on the growth rate of new technologies imply that 60% of the growth rate in steady-state
is accounted for by embodied technology; the remaining 40% is explained by a residual
or disembodied technology (thus, g¯ = 0.08), which is uncorrelated with the mechanisms
of the model (education, the organization and structure of the market, etc, are potential
candidates).23
The productivity of the innovation process, αRi , is set to satisfy equation (12) using
the data on R&D intensity, the number of exports as a proxy for the number of newly
produced technologies, and the number of imports as a measure of the spillovers from
foreign technologies. The results show that Asia and less innovative Europe have the low-
est productivity of innovation (0.0086 and 0.0186, respectively) whereas more innovative
Europe, the United States, and Japan have highest R&D productivity (0.0237, 0.0288,
and 0.0368, respectively).
The rate of adoption, αAi , is obtained using the survival techniques explained in Ap-
pendix D; the values are listed in Table 1. For the average country, it takes three and a
half years to start importing a good that has been developed elsewhere. Asia and Europe
take, on average, more than four years to start importing a good, whereas Japan and
the United States take between two and three years. Other studies that have quantiﬁed
the speed of adoption are Eaton and Kortum (1999) and Comin and Hobijn (2004). The
former study uses international patent data to measure international diﬀusion; the latter
uses direct measures of technology for many countries and a long time period. To my
knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to estimate hazard rates of adoption using trade data.
The parameters to be estimated are the elasticity of substitution across intermediate
goods, σ; the elasticity of adoption, γa; the extent of diminishing returns in the inno-
vation process, γr; and the standard deviations, σi, of the neutral technology shock and
innovation productivity shocks. The Bayesian approach has the beneﬁt of adding some
weight on the priors of the researchers and some weight on the data over the sample
period. By changing the standard deviation of the distribution on the priors, a measure
of tightness, we can change the relative weights on the priors and the data in determining
the posterior distribution for the parameters. In the limit, a diﬀuse or non-informative
distribution puts more weight on the data. The prior mean and standard deviation are
reported in Table 3 for the structural parameters and in Table 4 for the shock processes.
I assume a Gamma distribution for the elasticity of substitution across intermediate
goods, with mean 3 and standard deviation 0.15. Estimates of this parameter in the
trade and industrial organization literature typically range from 3 to 10, and it diﬀers
across goods, as shown by Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Weinstein (2008) who report lower
23These results are in line with what Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) found for the United
States. Although the Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) analysis is for the United States, we
can assume the same value for all the regions because technology diﬀusion guarantees that, in steady
state, embodied productivity growth is the same across countries.
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elasticities for more diﬀerentiated goods. Therefore, to use a single value for σ amounts
to a simplifying assumption. The prior for αAi , the cost of adoption in each region, is
distributed Gamma with mean 2 and standard deviation 0.15. The mean is set to match
the hazard rates in Table 1, which determine the rate of adoption. The prior for γr, the
diminishing returns in the innovation process, is set to a Beta distribution with mean
0.1 and standard deviation 0.15.24 The elasticity of adoption with respect to eﬀort, γa,
is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with mean 0.4 and standard deviation 0.05.25
Finally, I assume an Inverse Gamma distribution for the standard deviation of the shocks,
which guarantees a positive variance.
6.3 Estimation Results
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results. They contain the prior and posterior mean
of the estimated parameters as well as 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The posterior mean for the elasticity of substitution σ across intermediate goods is
3.5. Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Weinstein (2008)'s estimate is 3.4 for a sample of 73 countries.
The value I obtain lies between those obtained in microeconomic and in macroeconomic
studies.
The posterior mean for the elasticity of innovation γr is 0.8; this is close to the
estimates of Comin and Gertler (2006) and Griliches (1990), which range between 0.8 and
0.9. Eaton and Kortum (1999) ﬁnd a much lower value (about 0.02) when using labor
as the input to the innovation function. Finally, the posterior mean for the elasticity of
adoption γa is 0.35, half of what Comin and Gertler (2006) obtain for a closed economy.
This is expected, since adoption is slower across countries than within a country.
Next, Table 5 compares the standard deviation of several variables in our model and
with that in the data. Using the estimated parameters and standard deviations of the
shocks, I run 1,000 draws from the shocks in the model and then compute the standard
deviation of the simulated variables. Overall, the results are in line with the data.
I then compute correlations between growth in imports and real GDP per capita
growth, between R&D intensity and real GDP per capita growth, and between R&D
intensity and growth in imports (Table 6). As in the data, R&D and trade are negatively
correlated across countries; the same is true for R&D and productivity growth. Countries
24Eaton and Kortum (1999) ﬁnd a value of about 0.2 for this parameter; Griliches (1990), using the
number of new patents as a proxy for technological change, obtains estimates ranging from 0.5 to 1.
25 This parameter has been calibrated by Comin and Gertler (2006) and also by Comin, Gertler, and
Santacreu (2009); they ﬁnd that a reasonable value in a closed-economy model is 0.8. Because there
are no good measures of adoption expenditures or adoption rates, they use as a partial measure the
development costs incurred by manufacturing ﬁrms to make the goods usable (this is a subset of R&D
expenditures) and then regress the rate of decline of the relative price of capital with respect to the
partial measure of adoption costs. The idea is that the price of capital moves countercyclically with the
number of new adopted technologies and is thus a measure of embodied adoption. The regression yields
a constant of 0.8.
20
that invest less in R&D typically diversify their imports and grow at higher rates. The
model also captures the positive correlation between growth in imports and GDP per
capita, since countries that have diversiﬁed their imports are also growing faster. This
model captures the signs of the relations as well as their magnitude. In the data, the
correlation between growth and trade is 0.54 while the model predicts 0.57. For R&D
trade and R&Dgrowth correlations, respectively, the empirical values are -0.26 and -0.15
while the model's predictions are -0.21 and -0.16.
6.4 Speed of Convergence
The model has predictions for the speed of convergence that are consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings of the empirical growth literature. Note however that this literature relies on reduced
form models. Hence, my model of endogenous innovation and adoption adds structure to
the traditional analysis while remaining consistent with their main predictions.
In particular, I study how long it would take each region to reach levels of US income
per capita. For this, I use the estimated value of the structural parameters and the
standard deviation of the shocks to simulate the model for 1,000 periods.
The last three columns of Table 10 summarize the model implications for convergence.
In the data, Asia's income per capita in 1996 was 25% of that in the United States. Japan
is at the other extreme, with 80%. Europe lies in between: less innovative Europe is closer
to Asia while more innovative Europe is closer to Japan.
Columns 4 and 5 show each region's distance to the technological frontier once they
are halfway to the new steady state. Asia would improve its position by 68%, reaching a
42% income per capita of that in the United States, and this would take 40 years. Japan,
which is closer to the United States, would take only 15 years but improves by 22%.
Countries that lag behind (Asia and less innovative Europe) take longer to close the gap,
but their percentage improvement is greater. As the convergence theory predicts, the gap
narrows more slowly when it is close to the steady state.
Figure 4 displays the evolution of relative income per capita in Asia, Europe (less
and more innovative), and Japan with respect to the United States. The initial period is
1996, when the relative income per capita with respect to the United States was 25% in
Asia, 37% in less innovative Europe, 75% in more innovative Europe, and 80% in Japan.
The ﬁgure shows that convergence to the steady state is faster at early stages but slows
down when approaching the steady state, as the empirical growth literature estimates.
Note that the technological frontier is always moving forward because of global inno-
vation. In steady state, countries close the gap with the frontier but there is no (complete)
catching-up in their levels of income per capita. These results can be explained by diﬀer-
ences in policies and institutions, which are captured by the country-speciﬁc parameters
(Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005)).
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7 Decomposition of Productivity Growth
In this section I compute the contribution of domestic and foreign innovation to produc-
tivity growth in each region, as predicted by the model, and compare the results with the
available data.
7.1 Embodied versus Disembodied Productivity
In the model, economic growth is decomposed into: (i) embodied growth, captured by
an expansion in the number of intermediate goods (through innovation and international
diﬀusion); and (ii) disembodied growth, captured by an exogenous TFP shock.26 Taking
the estimated series of the TFP shock together with data on output growth from the
empirical analysis, I compute the contribution of each source of growth (Table 7).
Embodied growth has contributed about 78% of the productivity growth in Asia and
less innovative Europe, and about 67% of such growth in the United States, Japan,
and more innovative Europe. That is, the main mechanisms of the model (innovation
and international diﬀusion) are able to capture, on average, three-fourths of economic
growth in the regions of analysis. The remaining one-fourth cannot be explained by the
mechanisms of the model.
7.2 Contribution of Domestic and Foreign Innovation to Growth
Table 8 reports the contribution of domestic and foreign innovation to embodied pro-
ductivity growth. Each entry in the matrix represents the percentage of the embodied
productivity growth in the importer country (row) that is explained by innovations of
the exporter country (column), averaged over 19962005. The diagonal entries measure
the contribution of domestic innovation.
The analysis shows that, in Asia and less innovative Europe, more than 75% of total
growth can be explained by foreign innovations embodied in imports, especially those
from the United States, Japan, and more innovative Europe.27 In the most innovative
regions, 2030% of embodied productivity stems from domestic innovation. These results
are consistent with the empirical evidence: Asia does relatively little innovation but has
experienced a rapid increase in imported varietiesespecially from the United States
and Japan, which are the most innovative regions. By expanding the range of imported
varieties from more innovative countries, Asia and less innovative Europe accumulate the
technology embodied in the foreign varieties and grow more than average.
26We can interpret the TFP shock as capturing all sources of growth not explained by loveforvariety.
In that sense, this section is an empirical test of love-for-variety models.
27Foreign innovations explain 96% of embodied productivity growth in Asia, and embodied growth
constitutes 78% of its total productivity growth. Therefore, 75% of total growth in Asia stems from
foreign innovations.
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The results oﬀ the diagonal in Table 8 can be further decomposed to obtain the
contribution of each exporter; Table 9 reports the results. About two thirds of the
contribution of foreign sources of innovation in Europe and Asia come from Japan and
the United States. Asia and less innovative Europe's innovations contribute less than
10% to embodied productivity growth in the other regions.
The results reported in Tables 8 and 9 use research intensity as a measure of inno-
vation. In Table 10 I conduct the same decomposition, but use the number of exported
varieties instead. Table 10 reports, for each importer (row), the share of exports stem-
ming from each exporter (column). The results are similar to those reported in Tables
8 and 9. In Asia, 4% of total imports in varieties comes from less innovative countries
in Europe. The United States and Japan together account more than half the imported
varieties in each region; Asia and less innovative European countries contribute the least.
The results in Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with R&D being embodied in exports, since
the main exporters are the main innovators and since both foreign innovation and exports
from these countries have the more impact (than do domestic varieties) on the embodied
growth of developing countries.
8 Counterfactuals
Finally, I perform three counterfactual exercises. I analyze the eﬀect on world growth
rates, research intensity, and income per capita in steady state of: (1) a 25% increase
in research productivity, ﬁrst in the United States and then in Asia; (2) a change in the
speed of adoption between Asia and the United States; and (3) an increase in international
trade costs between Asia and the United States.
8.1 Increase in Research Productivity
First, I consider a 25% increase in the productivity of research in the United States,
αR(US), and analyze its impact on research intensity in Asia and the United States, the
world growth rate, and the relative income per capita of Asia with respect to the United
States.
In the new steady state, research intensity in the United States is 1.4% higher. Indeed,
an increase in research productivity increases the value of innovation, and more output
is invested in research. In Asia, however, research intensity decreases. Higher research
productivity in the United States crowds out innovation in its trading partners through a
reallocation of resources from innovation to adoption. This is especially true of countries
at early stages of development, when the cost of technological adoption is higher than
that of innovation. The world growth rate increases by 4% and the relative income per
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capita of Asia with respect to the United States is 4% higher.
Second, I consider a 25% increase in the productivity of research in Asia, αR(Asia),
and analyze its impact on the same variables.
In the new steady state, research intensity in Asia is 52% higher. In the United States,
however, research intensity decreases by 6%. As before, innovation in Asia crowds out
innovation in its trading partners. Asian investment in adoption decreases by 52% as
resources are reallocated to innovation. Since the United States is Asia's main source
of foreign innovation, lower adoption in Asia decreases the value of innovationand
therefore research intensityin the United States. The 52% increase in research intensity
in Asia barely aﬀects the world growth rate, which increases by a mere 0.05%. The relative
income per capita of Asia with respect to the United States is 0.55% higher.
This counterfactual analysis shows that increasing innovation in countries closer to the
technological frontier, such as the United States, substantially boosts the world growth
rate and the speed of convergence to the technological frontier. Developing countries do
not contribute substantially to world growth through innovation. Instead, as the next
counterfactual shows, a reallocation of resources from innovation to adoption in Asia may
be more eﬀective in increasing the world growth rate and accelerating convergence.
8.2 Changes in Asia's Adoption Rate
First, I consider an increase in Asia's adoption rates to US levels. In particular, I set
the hazard rates in Table 1 when Asia is the importer to the value when the United
States is the importer. Faster adoption increases research intensity in both regions. In
the United States, the value of innovation increases in response to increased demand from
Asia. In Asia, output rises because of an increase in foreign innovation, which increases
the value both of adoption and of innovation; the result is a 6% higher research intensity.
Faster adoption speeds up convergence, and Asia reaches a 4% higher (relative to the
United States) income per capita. The world growth rate is 7% higher. In countries at
early stages of development, faster adoption is more eﬀective than higher innovation at
boosting the world growth rate.
Second, I consider a reduction to zero in Asia's rate of adopting US innovations. In
the new steady state, research intensity in Asia and the United States is 40% lower, the
world growth rate declines 13%, and income per capita in Asia and the United States
diverges by 2%.
8.3 Increase in AsiaUS Trade Costs
I consider an increase (by 1% and 50%) in AsiaUS trade costs (d; see Table 2) and
analyze its impact on research intensity and income per capita in the two countries and
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also on the world growth rate. Overall, research intensity, the world growth rate, and
convergence all decrease.
A 1% increase in trade costs reduces research intensity by 8%, resulting in a 15%
lower world growth rate. If the trade costs increase to a nearly prohibitive 50%, then
research intensity declines by 60% and the world growth rate by 23%. In both cases,
Asia's income per capita diverges from US levels.
These results diﬀer from those of Atkeson and Burstein (2007), who report that if
all ﬁrms in a country export with equal intensity (as in my model), then changes in
international trade costs have no steady-state impact on the ﬁrm's investment in process
innovation.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which imports and growth
are connected by technological innovations and their international diﬀusion through trade.
The engine of growth is growth in productivity, which is itself driven by technology accu-
mulation. I analyze both the model's steady state and its transition dynamics. In steady
state, all countries grow at the same rate, but barriers to technology adoption induce
persistent income diﬀerences. Countries grow at diﬀerent rates during the transition. I
ﬁnd that innovation and adoption through imports aﬀect a country's productivity growth
diﬀerently as a function of its position on the transition path. Countries at early stages
of development, farther from the technological frontier, grow by adopting the new foreign
technologies embedded in the intermediate goods they import. Countries at later stages
of development, and close to the technological frontier, instead grow by developing new
technologies through R&D.
The analysis has abstracted from a number of interesting issues. For example, the
welfare eﬀects of innovation subsidies and the welfare gainsboth static and dynamicof
trade costs have important policy implications. These issues are left for future research.
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Figure 1: GDP per capita growth and growth in imported varieties (19942003)
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Figure 2: R&D intensity and GDP per capita (19942003)
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Table 1: Hazard rates of adoption (εin)
Exporter Importer Hazard rate
Europe+ Asia 0.20
Europe− Asia 0.15
Japan Asia 0.47
U.S. Asia 0.31
Asia Europe+ 0.20
Europe− Europe+ 0.27
Japan Europe+ 0.25
US Europe+ 0.25
Asia Europe− 0.12
Europe+ Europe− 0.26
Japan Europe− 0.14
US Europe− 0.22
Asia Japan 0.81
Europe+ Japan 0.38
Europe− Japan 0.16
US Japan 0.25
Asia US 0.26
Europe+ US 0.75
Europe− US 0.77
Japan US 0.20
Key: Europe+ = more innovative Europe; Europe− = less innovative Europe
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Table 2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.90 Discount factor
d(Asia,Europe−) 1.30 Iceberg transport costs
d(Asia,Europe+) 1.30 Iceberg transport costs
d(Asia, Japan) 1.10 Iceberg transport costs
d(Asia,US) 1.30 Iceberg transport costs
d(Europe−,Europe+) 1.05 Iceberg transport costs
d(Europe−, Japan) 1.40 Iceberg transport costs
d(Europe−,US) 1.30 Iceberg transport costs
d(Europe+, Japan) 1.40 Iceberg transport costs
d(Europe+,US) 1.30 Iceberg transport costs
d(Japan,US) 1.30 Iceberg transport costs
g¯ 0.02 Disembodied growth in steady state
αR(Asia) 0.0082 Innovation productivity
αR(Europe−) 0.0186 Innovation productivity
αR(Europe+) 0.0237 Innovation productivity
αR(Japan) 0.0288 Innovation productivity
αR(US) 0.0368 Innovation productivity
Table 3: Prior and posterior for the structural parameters
Parameter Prior Mean 5% 95%
σ Gamma(3, 0.15) 3.50 3.10 3.74
γa Beta(0.3, 0.15) 0.33 0.10 0.54
γr Beta(0.5, 0.15) 0.82 0.75 0.89
Note: The values in parentheses correspond to the mean and the standard deviation.
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Table 4: Prior and posterior for the shock processes
Parameter Prior Mean 5% 95%
σ(Asia) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.14 0.09 0.20
σ(Europe-) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.09 0.05 0.12
σ(Europe+) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.13 0.06 0.19
σ(Japan) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.08 0.05 0.11
σ(U.S.) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.07 0.03 0.11
σr(Asia) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.06 0.03 0.09
σr(Europe-) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.05 0.03 0.08
σr(Europe+) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.09 0.05 0.14
σr(Japan) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.05 0.03 0.07
σr(U.S.) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.04 0.03 0.06
me(Asia) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.04 0.03 0.06
me(Europe-) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.02 0.01 0.02
me(Europe+) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.04 0.02 0.06
me(Japan) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.03 0.02 0.05
me(U.S.) IGamma(0.05,∞) 0.03 0.02 0.04
Notes: IGamma = Inverse Gamma. The values in parentheses correspond to the mean and the
standard deviation.
Table 5: Comparison of unconditional momentsmodel versus data
Variable Model Data
gR&D(Asia) 0.0283 0.0330
gR&D(Europe−) 0.0262 0.0227
gR&D(Europe+) 0.0681 0.0915
gR&D(Japan) 0.0253 0.0225
gR&D(US) 0.0489 0.0345
gy(Asia) 0.0185 0.0168
gy(Europe− ) 0.0160 0.0104
gy(Europe+) 0.0063 0.0112
gy(Japan) 0.0270 0.0230
gy(US) 0.0223 0.0125
gimports(Asia) 0.0342 0.0424
gimports(Europe−) 0.0072 0.0079
gimports(Europe+) 0.0114 0.0078
gimports(Japan) 0.0183 0.0219
gimports(US) 0.0167 0.0215
Table 6: Comparison of unconditional momentsmodel versus data
Correlation Model Data
(R&D, Trade) −0.21 −0.26
(Growth, Trade) 0.57 0.54
(Growth, R&D) −0.16 −0.15
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Table 7: Embodied versus disembodied productivity growth in the transition (percentage)
Region Embodied Disembodied
Asia 78 22
Europe− 77 23
Europe+ 81 19
Japan 70 30
United States 70 30
Table 8: Sources of growth predicted by the modeldomestic and foreign innovation
Source Country
Destination Asia Europe− Europe+ Japan US
Asia 4.0 7.8 15.8 21.3 29.1
Europe− 4.7 7.5 17.0 19.9 27.8
Europe+ 4.3 8.0 19.6 21.1 28.0
Japan 3.3 7.7 16.0 19.9 29.1
US 4.2 6.8 21.2 20.3 26.5
Table 9: Foreign sources of growthbilateral contribution predicted by the model
Source Country
Destination Asia Europe− Europe+ Japan US
Asia 10.6 21.3 28.8 39.3
Europe− 6.8 24.5 28.6 40.1
Europe+ 7.1 13.0 34.4 45.6
Japan 5.8 13.8 28.5 51.9
US 8.0 13.0 40.3 38.6
Table 10: Foreign sources of growthbilateral contribution in the data
Source Country
Destination Asia Europe− Europe+ Japan US
Asia 4.1 19.2 36.3 40.4
Europe− 9.3 37.1 15.9 37.6
Europe+ 14.3 15.5 22.9 47.4
Japan 20.0 5.4 22.6 51.9
US 20.9 10.9 31.1 37.1
Table 11: Speed of convergence
Region Years to Relative pc Improvement Relative pc
convergence income (1996) income (SS)
Asia 40 25% 68% 42%
Europe− 30 37% 62% 67%
Europe+ 20 70% 28% 90%
Japan 15 80% 22% 98%
US Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
Key: pc = per capita; SS = steady state.
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Figure 4: Speed of convergence
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Table 12: Increase in US research productivity (25% increase)
Variable % change
∆r(Asia) −3.5%
∆r(US) 1.4%
∆g∗ 3.7%
∆Y (Asia)
Y (US)
70%
Table 13: Increase in Asian research productivity (25% increase)
Variable % change
∆r(Asia) 52%
∆r(US) −6%
g∗ 0.05%
Y (Asia)
Y (US)
40%
Table 14: If Asia adopts at the speed of the United States
Variable Change
∆r(Asia) 6.2%
∆r(US) 0.7%
∆g∗ 7.3%
∆Y (Asia)
Y (US)
3.8%
Table 15: If zero rate of adoption in Asia from the United States
Variable Change
∆r(Asia) −40%
∆r(US) −49%
∆g∗ −13%
∆Y (Asia)
Y (US)
−3%
Table 16: Increase in trade costs between Asia and the United States
Variable Change (τ = 1%) Change (τ = 50%)
∆r(Asia) −7.3% −58%
∆r(US) −8.9% −56%
∆g∗ −15% −23%
∆Y (Asia)
Y (US)
−2% −44%
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A Country List
Table 17: Country List
Region Country Code Country Name
Africa SAU Saudi Arabia
Asia CHN China
Asia HKG China, Hong Kong SAR
Asia IDN Indonesia
Asia IND India
Asia SGP Singapore
Asia THA Thailand
Less innovative Europe CYP Cyprus
Less innovative Europe CZE Czech Republic
Less innovative Europe GRC Greece
Less innovative Europe HRV Croatia
Less innovative Europe HUN Hungary
Less innovative Europe IRL Ireland
Less innovative Europe LTU Lithuania
Less innovative Europe LVA Latvia
Less innovative Europe MLT Malta
Less innovative Europe POL Poland
Less innovative Europe PRT Portugal
Less innovative Europe SVK Slovakia
Less innovative Europe SVN Slovenia
Less innovative Europe TUR Turkey
Japan JPN Japan
Japan KOR Korea
LatinAmerica ARG Argentina
LatinAmerica BRA Brazil
United States US United States
More innovative Europe AUT Austria
More innovative Europe BEL Belgium
More innovative Europe CHE Switzerland
More innovative Europe DEU Germany
More innovative Europe DNK Denmark
More innovative Europe ESP Spain
More innovative Europe FIN Finland
More innovative Europe FRA France
More innovative Europe GBR United Kingdom
More innovative Europe ISL Iceland
More innovative Europe ITA Italy
More innovative Europe NLD Netherlands
More innovative Europe NOR Norway
More innovative Europe SWE Sweden
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B Product Classiﬁcation
The codes are stipulated by the UN's Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classiﬁcation,
which groups external trade data in terms of the three basic classes of goods in the System
of National Accounts (SNA).
1. Capital goods
Sum of categories:
41* Capital goods (except transport equipment)
521* Transport equipment, industrial
2. Intermediate goods
Sum of categories:
111* Food and beverages, primary, mainly for industry
121* Food and beverages, processed, mainly for industry
21* Industrial supplies not elsewhere speciﬁed, primary
22* Industrial supplies not elsewhere speciﬁed, processed
31* Fuels and lubricants, primary
322* Fuels and lubricants, processed (other than motor spirits)
42* Parts and accessories of capital goods (except transport equipment)
53* Parts and accessories of transport equipment
3. Consumption goods
Sum of categories:
112* Food and beverages, primary, mainly for household consumption
122* Food and beverages, processed, mainly for household consumption
522* Transport equipment, non-industrial
61* Consumer goods not elsewhere speciﬁed, durable
62* Consumer goods not elsewhere speciﬁed, semidurable
63* Consumer goods not elsewhere speciﬁed, nondurable
C Measuring Real GDP
The measure of real GDP used in the empirical analysis was computed while accounting
for (i) the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the terms of trade across countries and (ii) the extensive
margin of trade in the price of imported intermediate goods.
As recently argued by Feenstra, Heston, Timmer, and Deng (2009), the World De-
velopment Indicators and Penn World Table (PWT) measure of real GDP represents the
ability of a representative agent in the country's economy to purchase goods and services.
However, that interpretation of real GDP diﬀers from the one used in growth analysis,
where GDP per capita is a measure of productivity. To compute real GDP from the
output side, Feenstra, Heston, Timmer, and Deng (2009) correct the PWT measure for
diﬀerences in the terms of trade across countries. This diﬀerence reﬂects the trading
opportunities that countries have (as measured by their ratio of export prices to import
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prices), and it is shown empirically that the diﬀerences can be substantialespecially for
small open economies.
To make the measure of real GDP growth from the output side comparable to the real
GDP used in my model, an adjustment must be made for the extensive margin of imports.
Toward this end, I use the procedure followed in Broda, Greenﬁeld, and Weinstein (2008).
The diﬀerence between the adjusted and unadjusted calculations gives a measure of the
impact of product variety in trade on productivity, or of the gains from trade due to
product variety.
D Hazard Rates of Adoption
I use the tools of survival analysis (a.k.a. duration analysis) with censored data. I estimate
a nonparametric survival function (using the KaplanMeier estimator with right-censored
data). Ideally we would know the time at which each good is invented by the exporter and
the time at which it is ﬁrst imported by each destination, but there are several limitations
in the data. First, I do not observe the time of invention; instead, I assume that this is
given by the ﬁrst time a source starts exporting a good to any country.
Second, there is left and right censoring in the data. There is left censoring because
we do not know whether products exported in 1994 were invented in that year or earlier;
there is right censoring because some importers had not adopted, before 2003, all the
goods that had been exported. It is easy to ﬁx the problem of right censoring, but left-
censored data is more problematic (though it is straightforward to handle if we assume
that the hazard rate does not vary with duration). The standard way to deal with left
censoring is to drop the spells that started before the window of observation.
E Steady-State growth rate
From the expression Tit = Zit+
∑M
n=1A
i
nt, the growth rate of intermediate goods in steady
state can be obtained as follows,
gi =
∆Ti
Ti
=
∆Zi
Ti
+
M∑
n=1
∆Ain
Ti
(34)
Substituting equations (12) and (15) into equation (34), productivity growth in steady
state can be expressed as a function of the amount of research that has been done around
the world:
g = gi = αir
γr
i +
M∑
n=1
εin
t∑
s=1
(1− εin)−(t−s)αnsrγrns
Tns
Tit
(35)
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where rn =
yrn
yn
.
Since Tns = Tnt(1+g)
(t−s) and rns = rn∀s in steady state, and taking into account that
instantaneous diﬀusion within the country implies that εii = 1, we can rewrite equation
(34) as
g =
M∑
n=1
εinαnr
γr
n
M∑
s=1
(
(1− εin)
(1 + g)
)−(t−s)
=
M∑
n=1
εinαnr
γr
n
(1 + g)
g + εin
Tnt
Tit
(36)
With positive values for γr, αn, εin and rn, the Frobenious Theorem guarantees that
we can obtain a value for the growth rate g and relative productivity Ti
Tn
.
It is important to note that, if there were no sources of heterogeneity in the country,
that is, if αRi = α
R, αAi = α
A, Li = L and d
i
n = d ∀i, n, then we would reach a steady
state with all the countries investing the same quantity of ﬁnal output into R&D and
adoption, demanding the same amount of intermediate goods, and reaching the same
level of income per capita.
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